Trump’s Tomahawk Trap - Scott Ritter

The Insider’s Verdict: Biography and the Uncomfortable Truth

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Why Trump’s Tomahawk promise is not a show of strength, but the most dangerous escalation risk since the war began.

Scott Ritter is a veteran of intelligence analysis and arms control whose career led him directly into the deepest trenches of geopolitical conflict.

• The Insider: Between 1991 and 1998, Ritter served as a central weapons inspector for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq.
• The Officer: Prior to that, he served as a Marine Intelligence Officer for the United States Marine Corps—including during the Gulf War—dealing directly with missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats.
• The Whistleblower: As an inspector, he led numerous missions. But his resignation in 1998 was an early warning sign: the UN and the U.S., Ritter claimed, were not determined enough to actually eliminate all forbidden weapons.

In the following years, Ritter became one of the sharpest critics of U.S. foreign policy, particularly the wars and interventions justified by the alleged existence of WMDs—a claim that proved to be a fundamental lie after the 2003 invasion.

💬 “You can’t smash an empire by bombing it with lies.”

His transformation from inspector to warning signal clarifies Ritter’s central thesis: States deceive their populations—not only in the name of security but for geopolitical power politics.

The Tomahawk Illusion – A Wonder Weapon That Doesn’t Work

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Military systems derive their effectiveness not from myth, but from verifiable reality—and that is precisely where the Tomahawk narrative collapses.

💬 “This is orders of magnitude more dangerous than ATACMS missiles. What has changed?”

Donald Trump has made a decision—or at least something resembling one. He wants to provide Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. Not directly, but through a NATO intermediary. First, however, he wants to know what they intend to do with them. As if these weapons were meant for interior decoration.

Scott Ritter, former UN weapons inspector and Marine intelligence officer, responds to this announcement with cold clarity. He knows the Tomahawk from direct experience—he keeps the remains of one of these missiles, dismantled under the INF Treaty, in his basement. He has seen them used in the Gulf War. And he knows what the official narrative leaves out: the Tomahawk is not a wonder weapon.

The inconvenient truth about the Tomahawk missile:

• There is a figure that remains largely unspoken—the actual hit rate during the Gulf War
• If it had been close to 100 percent, it would have been endlessly publicized
• Repeatedly used against Syria—jammed, missing targets, landing intact in open fields
• Russia has examined advanced Block IV models in original condition—and is not alarmed

Thirty-five Tomahawks were launched during the U.S. strike on Isfahan. Isfahan still stands. Dozens were fired at Taji in Iraq. Ritter inspected Taji many times as a weapons inspector. It still stands. The idea that a handful of Tomahawks could radically alter the course of the war is pure illusion—a wishful fantasy.

What ultimately remains of the Tomahawk is not the aura of a decisive weapon, but the image of a system whose political symbolism far exceeds its military effect. Its history is not one of reliable decision-making, but of projection: belief persists because alternatives no longer do. That is where its real danger lies—not on the battlefield, but in the minds of decision-makers.

Trump’s Fundamental Reversal – From Peacemaker to Escalator

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Between campaign promises and strategic reality lies a widening gap—one increasingly filled with escalation.

💬 “He said it was completely irresponsible—because it creates instability that could lead to a world war, a nuclear war. And he said, ‘If I’m president, I won’t allow this.’”

In December, Donald Trump gave an interview to Time magazine. He sharply criticized the Biden administration for allowing Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles— with ranges of three to four hundred miles—deep inside Russian territory. He called it completely irresponsible, warning that it created instability that could lead to a world war.

Congress appeared convinced by this logic. A resolution was introduced to prohibit Biden from selling ATACMS missiles to Ukraine. Any form of support—logistical, communications-based, or intelligence-related—that would enable targeting was also to be banned, precisely because such assistance was considered inherently destabilizing.

And now Trump says: “No, I will give Ukraine Tomahawks.”

The Tomahawk is orders of magnitude more dangerous:

• ATACMS: 300–400 miles range
• Tomahawk: 1,500 miles range
• Tomahawk is nuclear-capable
• Russia’s nuclear doctrine: an attack using nuclear-capable systems is treated as a nuclear attack by a nuclear power

Scott Ritter poses the obvious question: “What has changed?” The answer is uncomfortable. Trump is embarrassed. He invested significant political capital in ending the conflict—and failed. He said he would pick up the phone and end the war. He claimed to have a great relationship with Putin. That did not work.

Trump’s reversal is not a strategic reassessment, but a political reaction to unmet expectations. Those who promise peace and fail come under pressure to project strength—even when that projection directly contradicts their earlier arguments. The Tomahawk thus becomes not a military option, but a substitute for lost credibility.

Russophobes in Trump’s Orbit – Poison at the Core of Government

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Political decisions are never made in a vacuum, but in the echo chamber of institutional bias.

💬 “Every single one of these organizations is deeply infused with Russophobia and staffed by Russophobes. The CIA in particular has long since lost the ability to think objectively about Russia.”

Who are the officials telling Keith Kellogg that Russia cannot win this war? When Kellogg was appointed special envoy, he was assigned a team. Staff from the CIA, DIA, NSA, and the State Department were embedded in his support group. Every single one of these institutions, Ritter argues, is saturated with Russophobia.

The senior CIA official who briefed Trump on the eve of the Alaska summit was Julia Gaganis. In 2016, she served as the National Intelligence Officer for Russia, overseeing the assessment that Vladimir Putin interfered in the U.S. election on Trump’s behalf. She is a Russophobe. She knows nothing about Russia.

The poison of Russophobia:

• It frames Putin exclusively as an autocrat
• It rejects the legitimacy of Russian democracy outright
• It is reinforced by figures such as Fiona Hill and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
• These figures advise Keith Kellogg and shape his worldview

But this influence was hardly necessary. Kellogg himself is a Russophobe. The little he claims to know about Russia is fundamentally wrong. One can read what he wrote about Ukraine before Trump’s presidency—virtually all of it is factually incorrect. The sources he cites come directly from Ukraine.

Keith Kellogg functions as a Ukrainian agent. He has just received a high decoration from Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He is effectively working on Ukraine’s behalf. A man decorated by the Ukrainian president receives information from openly anti-Russian elements—and Washington then wonders why he says what he says.

The Tomahawk Timeline – By 2028, Ukraine Is History

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Weapons have no effect when they arrive only after the war has already been decided.

💬 “Unless something fundamental changes, it is impossible for Ukraine to receive a Tomahawk before 2028. So what are we even talking about?”

Trump’s plan envisions Tomahawk missiles being transferred to Ukraine through a NATO intermediary. But which NATO country actually has Tomahawk capability? Only one: the United Kingdom. And the UK will not hand over its Tomahawks. These systems are bound by U.S.–UK agreements governing satellite access and encryption.

There is one other country: the Netherlands. They expected their first delivery in 2018, began testing in 2023, and only in April 2025 did they actually test a Tomahawk launched from one of their frigates. Deliveries begin in 2028.

The lethal mathematics:

• The Netherlands will not receive Tomahawks before 2028
• They would then have to transfer them to Ukraine
• At the current loss rate, Ukraine will not exist in 2028
• Ukraine is losing 7,000 to 8,000 soldiers every week

The last time Scott Ritter checked the calendar, it was 2025. The last time he reviewed the casualty figures, Ukraine—at this rate—will likely no longer exist by 2028. The problem, therefore, exists from the outset.

The Tomahawk timeline exposes the debate as political theater. Weapons that can only be delivered after the war is decided do not change reality—they merely shift responsibility. Anyone invoking 2028 is not talking about assistance, but about deflection. Ukraine is not the objective of this plan; it is its pretext.

Putin’s Strength – Winning Without Overreaction

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Strategic patience is often mistaken for weakness in the West—a consequential error.

💬 “Russia has responded to everything. Russia has killed Ukrainian soldiers. Russia has defeated the Ukrainian army. Nothing the West does has any meaningful impact on Russia.”

Scott Ritter is unequivocal in his criticism of those who portray Vladimir Putin as weak—particularly Gilbert Doctorow: “This is completely irresponsible and shows a total lack of understanding of reality in Russia. This is a man sitting in Belgium, watching Russian television.”

Putin enjoys approval ratings of more than 80 percent among the Russian population. In the entire course of world history, no leader with that level of public support has ever been overthrown by a coup. Not once.

Why this criticism of Putin is dangerous:

• It reinforces voices in Donald Trump’s inner circle
• It feeds Russophobic stereotypes
• It suggests the West has a chance to trigger a coup
• It echoes the logic of Jim Carrey in Dumb and Dumber: “So you’re telling me there’s a chance?”

What Doctorow is arguing is that if the West simply continues to apply pressure, a coup will occur. Putin will fall. This is extraordinarily foolish and dangerous—because there are people around Donald Trump who actually believe it.

Putin’s strength lies not in dramatic reactions, but in his refusal to follow the West’s escalation tempo. Russia is pursuing a clearly defined strategic path and has no incentive to abandon it for symbolic gestures. Those who interpret patience as weakness are projecting their own impatience—and failing to grasp the critical difference between reaction and control.

The Sanctions Catastrophe – Failed Twenty Times, Yet Repeated

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When measures fail to produce results but are pursued anyway, they cease to be strategy and become dogma.

💬 “I think number 19 or 20 is the latest version of the sanctions package. There are twenty because all the previous ones failed.”

Europeans now openly admit that their own energy prices are crippling them—because they cut themselves off from Russian oil and gas. And then comes the lament: “The Russians went to China and India.”

Scott Ritter’s response is blunt: “What on earth did you expect? You call yourselves strategic planners and never once asked the obvious question: How will they respond?”

The reality of the Russian economy:

• Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy (purchasing power parity)
• Gas shortages—perhaps in Crimea
• Gas prices rising—maybe slightly in Moscow
• No car lines anywhere across Russia

Russia prepared for this outcome because Vladimir Putin is a strategic thinker. Instead of watching Russian television, critics would do better to follow the president as he travels across the country, meeting with governors to discuss how problems are being managed and overcome.

Russia understands that this is a conflict, and that conflicts come with costs. But observers keep asking: Why doesn’t Russia respond more forcefully? How much more decisive should it be? Russian forces are killing Ukrainian troops on the battlefield. That is their primary strategy.

Ukraine as the Third Sister – Why Russia Does Not Decapitate

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Without cultural and historical context, Russian behavior remains inherently unintelligible to Western observers.

💬 “If you don’t understand that Russia views Ukraine as the third sister, then you don’t understand Russia—and you don’t understand why Putin behaves the way he does.”

Scott Ritter was invited in August by the National Unity Club. The group is affiliated with the Union State—the political and economic framework linking Russia and Belarus. But when they speak of their ideal, they speak of three sisters.

There is a third sister out there: Ukraine. The Union State, in this conception, does not truly exist until the third sister returns home.

Why Russia does not decapitate the Ukrainian leadership:

• Ukraine is the third sister meant to return
• After the 12-day war, Iran shows no internal fractures
• Russia seeks to bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence
• That is all—nothing more

Russia is winning this war according to its own timetable. Anyone frustrated with Vladimir Putin is operating on a timeline detached from Russian reality—a Belgian timeline or a Washington timeline.

Russia’s restraint toward a decapitation strategy is not a sign of military limitation, but an expression of a political end state. Those who view Ukraine solely as an enemy state miss the deeper logic of this war: it is meant to be concluded, not annihilated. That is precisely why Russia follows a different tempo—and refuses actions that would make any future reintegration impossible.

The Tomahawk as Bait – Russia Does Not Take It

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Not every provocation demands an immediate response—some are designed precisely to provoke one.

💬 “The Tomahawks are bait—bait designed to trigger a Russian reaction. Putin does not take the bait.”

Vladimir Putin addressed the Tomahawk directly at the Valdai forum. First: it is an old system. We know it. We can intercept it. It will not change the battlefield reality in any meaningful way. We have it under control.

But if the United States were to deploy it, that would fundamentally alter the relationship between the United States and Russia. At a moment when there is a faint light at the end of the tunnel, such a move would effectively seal that tunnel shut.

Russia’s position on strategic deterrence:

• Russia is comfortable with its current posture
• It possesses modern weapons capable of penetrating any air defense system
• It retains enormous flexibility and operational capability
• There is no sense of panic

Would Russia prefer an arms control regime? Certainly—if the United States is willing. If not, Russia remains confident in its present position. There is no anxiety on Putin’s side.

This posture, however, is interpreted as weakness by those who do not understand Russian reality. And unfortunately, voices around Donald Trump keep repeating the same refrain: “Don’t worry—the Russians are bluffing.”

The Tomahawk bait is not intended to achieve military effect, but to elicit a psychological reaction. Its purpose is to knock Russia off its strategic equilibrium and provoke an action that reframes the conflict. Putin’s refusal to engage is not passivity, but a deliberate decision to deny the West exactly what it seeks: escalation as an escape from a deteriorating strategic position.

Russia Is Winning – And That Is Why It Does Not Overreact

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Superiority is not expressed through the noise of escalation, but through control over one’s own trajectory.

💬 “They are massively outperforming the United States and NATO combined in production. They are producing better weapons in larger quantities. What do people expect Russia to do? Russia is winning.”

Readers need to grasp a central reality: this is not merely Russia versus Ukraine. It is Russia versus the collective West—Russia versus the entire industrial and military capacity of NATO.

And Russia is outperforming all of them in production. It is manufacturing better weapons in greater quantities. What, exactly, do people expect Russia to do?

Why Russia maintains its course:

• Russia is winning on its own timetable
• It is not attempting to physically destroy NATO
• It is not trying to occupy Europe
• It is seeking to bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence

Everything external observers advocate would push Russia onto a fundamentally different path—one that would inevitably lead to escalation. And escalation would produce a completely different type of conflict, with outcomes that diverge sharply from what Russia is currently pursuing.

What must be understood is this: the West wants Russia to deviate from the path on which it is presently winning. Because as things stand, that path leads to a Russian victory.

Russia’s behavior only makes sense once the frame of reference shifts. This is not about short-term dominance, but about structural advantage: industrial capacity, manpower endurance, and strategic coherence. As long as this framework holds, Russia has no reason to accelerate the conflict—because time is not working against it, but for it.

The Nuclear Threshold – When the Bait Becomes Catastrophe

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Deterrence ends where systems are deployed whose payload can no longer be distinguished.

💬 “Russian nuclear doctrine explicitly states: if a nuclear power enables a non-nuclear state to attack Russia, that attack is treated as coming from the nuclear power itself.”

This is where the discussion becomes lethally serious. If the United States provides Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles for ground attack—systems that are nuclear-capable—it becomes impossible to predict how Russia will respond.

What is clear, however, is that Russia may interpret such an act as a nuclear attack carried out by a nuclear power.

The logic of nuclear escalation:

• The Tomahawk is nuclear-capable
• Range: 1,500 miles—reaching Moscow, St. Petersburg, and strategic targets
• Russia cannot know whether an incoming Tomahawk is conventionally or nuclear armed
• Nuclear doctrine assigns responsibility to the supplying nuclear power

The Tomahawk question is designed precisely for this scenario. It is not a decisive turning point; it will not win the war for Ukraine. What it could produce, however, is a chain of miscalculations that ultimately brings the United States and Russia into a nuclear confrontation.

The nuclear threshold is not crossed by intent, but by ambiguity. Systems whose payload cannot be distinguished impose decision pressure under extreme time constraints. In such moments, political rhetoric is irrelevant—doctrine prevails. And Russia’s doctrine is explicit. The Tomahawk question is therefore not a military detail, but a potential trigger for escalation beyond any meaningful control.

Trump’s Withdrawal – Europe Left With the Bill

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American disengagement does not mean peace, but the transfer of burden.

💬 “Donald Trump has walked away from this conflict, exactly as he promised. He said: ‘If I don’t get a deal, I walk away from this war.’”#

Kaja Kallas cracked the code. She stepped up to the microphone and said: “Trump has abandoned Ukraine. The United States is pulling back and leaving it to us. And we cannot do it. We don’t have the resources.”

Nothing Trump says at the moment translates into a concrete, factual change in the American position. Donald Trump has disengaged from this conflict. He made clear that this meant leaving the door open to help Ukraine survive—but that Europe would have to carry the burden.

Europe’s desperate predicament:

• Europe cannot carry this burden
• This is not “he ain’t heavy, he’s my brother”
• It is a massive load of obligations dumped onto Europe’s back by the United States
• Europe lacks the strength to bear it

The change is superficial. The change is cosmetic. The change is political. Donald Trump acts according to the principle of “peace through strength”—but that requires the appearance of strength. At present, there is none.

Trump’s withdrawal is not a departure from war, but a redistribution of its costs. The United States is shedding operational responsibility without ending the dynamics of escalation. Europe is left with obligations it cannot sustain—militarily or economically—and with decisions it did not make.

Extended Range Attack Missile – The Next Phantom Wonder Weapon

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Announced quantities do not replace existing production lines.

💬 “The contract provides for the production of a single prototype to be delivered this month. Prototype. That’s it—one. How do you get 3,200 out of that?”

Let’s look at the Extended Range Attack Missile (ERAM)—allegedly 3,200 units on the way to Ukraine. A turning point, except that the contract calls for the production of a single prototype.

Prototype. That’s it—one.

The mathematics of phantom weapons:

• Once production begins: roughly 1,000 per year
• To deliver 3,200 to Ukraine: again, 2028
• Ukraine will not exist in 2028
• The production lines are not even built

The focus remains on what Donald Trump says, not on what is actually being done. That is the mistake. Trump speaks in order to project strength, but the factual American position does not change.

At present, the Extended Range Attack Missile does not exist as an operational capability, but as a contractual placeholder. As long as production lines are absent and quantities remain hypothetical, this is not military power, but communicative substitution. In the reality of war, what matters are systems that are available—not those that are merely announced.

Patriot Missiles – What Ukraine Actually Needs

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Defense systems are only as effective as their availability and their real-world success rate.

💬 “Ukraine needs Patriot missiles. But there are reports that the Russians have cracked the code. At the moment, the Patriot system has a success rate of six percent.”

What Ukraine needs more than anything else are not Tomahawk missiles. It needs Patriot missiles. But the Patriot system currently shows a success rate of six percent—six percent. That is effectively nothing.

And there are not enough Patriot missiles. Not enough Patriot systems.

Why the United States is not supplying them:

• The U.S. is not selling because it needs to rebuild its own stockpiles
• A potential conflict with China in the Pacific—insufficient missile reserves there
• Israel could once again be drawn into a war with Iran
• If matters escalate with Russia, the U.S. will need its own missiles

Europe would have to purchase the systems, procure them, and then transfer them onward. But the United States has said: “We are not selling.” As a result, there are no missiles for Ukraine. This is what Ukraine needs—but cannot obtain.

Ukraine does not require new symbols of escalation, but functional defense. Yet even this minimal requirement collides with the reality of Western stockpiles, production bottlenecks, and competing theaters of crisis. What is needed is not available—and what is available is being withheld. This is not strategy, but an admission of limited capacity.

Israel’s Lost War – The Truth About the 12-Day War

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Military striking power loses its value when it no longer produces political control.

💬 “Israel gave everything it had—and Iran is still standing. And now it’s starting to hit back. They had to stop the bar fight.”

Scott Ritter turns to the other burning conflict. Benjamin Netanyahu claims Iran possesses missiles with an 8,000-kilometer range. They want to hit Mar-a-Lago. They want to target Donald Trump—that place in Florida he likes so much.

That was foolish. Why would he do that? Because he panicked.

The reality of the 12-day war:

• Israel struck Iran with everything it had
• The blow was severe—the top military leadership was taken out
• But Iran recovered
• Toward the end of the war, Iranian missiles hit targets that caused Israel serious pain

Israel’s leadership told Netanyahu: “If we continue, they will hit us very hard. We have to end this war now—we have lost control over the outcome.”

Imagine walking into a bar, landing your best punch—and the other guy turns around and says, “Ouch. Alright, let’s go.” That is Israel right now. It hit Iran with everything it had—and Iran is still standing.

The 12-day war does not mark an Israeli success, but the loss of strategic initiative. A strike that fails to incapacitate the opponent and instead forces adaptation shifts the balance of power over time. Israel’s decision to end the conflict was not an act of restraint, but the recognition of a limit that could not be crossed.

Iran’s New Weapons – What Israel Cannot Stop

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Technological surprise often decides wars more quietly, but more decisively, than massive first strikes.

💬 “Toward the end of the war, Iran began deploying a new system that cut through their defenses like a hot knife through butter. Very little is actually known about these systems.”

What changed after the 12-day war? Did Israel’s ballistic missile defense shield improve? No. Iran began the conflict by firing missiles that were 20 to 30 years old, saturating the system. These capabilities were already known to Israel.

But toward the end of the war, Iran began deploying different missiles—either older systems with new warhead configurations or newer hypersonic weapons.

Iran’s hidden capabilities:

• Toward the end, Iran revealed a new system
• It penetrated defenses like a hot knife through butter
• A building was destroyed—instantaneously
• Israel has no counter for it

Scott Ritter’s assessment is blunt: the Iranians may not call it “Oreshnik,” but they have something that achieves the same effect. And Israel has no answer to it.

Israel’s offensive capability has not improved—nor has its defensive capability. Why would Israel promote a war with Iran that basic logic suggests it would lose?

By deploying these new systems, Iran did not demonstrate the full extent of its power, but what it chose to withhold. The disclosure was calibrated, targeted, and free of propagandistic display. That is precisely where its deterrent effect lies: deterrence by implication, not escalation. For Israel, this represents a new reality—not tomorrow, but now.

Iranian Unity – The End of Western Expectations

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External threat often integrates societies more effectively than internal reform promises.

💬 “After the 12-day war, there are no more fractures. Iran is more united than ever. Anyone who believes Iran can be exploited and torn apart should think again.”

Scott Ritter recounts having the opportunity to listen to Iran’s president in New York. He did not see a frightened man. He did not see a worried man. He saw someone serious—and deeply confident in his country’s strength.

The president said: “You can try to decapitate me. You say there are six of me. We have already selected the next one. If you kill him, we have another ready. We go six levels deep.”

What the West overlooked:

• Before the 12-day war, there were tensions between the president and the leadership
• There were visible cracks within Iranian society
• Parliamentary criticism existed
• Israeli planners perceived vulnerability to internal division

After the 12-day war, Iran is tightly bound together—sealed with industrial-strength glue. It is not coming apart. And the Israelis know it.

Israelis are not especially prone to self-deception. They act based on outcomes. And the realists advising Benjamin Netanyahu are telling him the same thing: the conditions they hoped would emerge no longer exist. In fact, attempting to exploit Iran now would backfire.

Western hopes of internal fragmentation in Iran collapsed with the 12-day war. External pressure did not expose weakness—it produced political cohesion. For future strategies, this leads to an uncomfortable truth: influence through destabilization has not only failed, it has achieved the opposite of what was intended.

America’s Empty Threats – Why the Bases Are Vulnerable

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Military presence does not equal strategic invulnerability.

💬 “Every single base from which American aircraft would operate is vulnerable to Iranian ballistic missile strikes. And there is nothing that could stop them.”

There is speculation about tankers and aircraft flowing into the Middle East. Will the United States become involved in a war with Iran? Every single base from which American aircraft would operate is vulnerable to Iranian ballistic missile attacks.

And there is no American defense system capable of stopping them.

What would the United States gain?

• Humiliation
• Defeat
• No military superiority

Scott Ritter is not among those who believe war is inevitable. He sees extensive bluffing and posturing. But he does not believe war is unavoidable—because as long as nothing emerges to restore Israeli military superiority, Israel would lose such a war.

The vulnerability of American bases is not a theoretical risk, but a known fact. In a direct conflict, deterrence would give way to geography. Anyone considering military options without accounting for this reality is not calculating losses—they are ignoring them.

The NATO Illusion – No Conventional Capability Against Russia

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Alliances exist on paper—wars are fought with available troops.

💬 “NATO cannot conduct offensive operations—it simply does not have the troops for it. General, with which troops exactly?”

Europe is asking whether it possesses its own defense systems capable of protecting the continent. France and the United Kingdom maintain a limited nuclear deterrent. But once the discussion turns nuclear, Europe ceases to exist.

Conventional reality demands arithmetic. Ukraine fields an army of roughly 700,000 to 900,000 soldiers. Russia has deployed approximately 780,000 troops in the so-called “special military operation.”

The mathematics of the impossible:

• 750,000 Russian troops facing roughly 800,000 Ukrainian troops
• A war involving Poland or the Baltic states would require the same scale
• It is impossible for NATO to mobilize 700,000 troops
• It is equally impossible for Russia to mobilize 800,000 troops for offensive operations

Chris Donahue spoke about neutralizing Kaliningrad: “We could do that very quickly.” Scott Ritter’s response was blunt: “No, you can’t, General. With which troops?”

Ritter estimates General Donahue’s life expectancy at roughly one hour from the moment NATO forces attack Kaliningrad. Such an action would constitute a general war with Russia. One of the first targets Russia would eliminate is the command center from which General Donahue would be operating.

NATO possesses political reach, but not the operational substance required for a conventional large-scale war with Russia. Deterrence without troops, without depth, and without industrial reserve remains a narrative. Claiming military capability that cannot be mobilized in reality replaces strategy with self-reassurance.

NATO as the Rabid Dog – Atticus Finch’s Solution

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Those perceived as uncontrollable lose the status of negotiable actors.

💬 “NATO is the bad nephew Russia will put a bullet in—the rabid dog. Russia is Atticus Finch—they will shoot it in the street.”

NATO is not the “third sister.” Russia is not inviting it back into the fold. NATO is the bad nephew—the rabid dog Russia would shoot. If NATO chooses to behave like a rabid dog, it will be treated like one. Russia, in this metaphor, is Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird—the figure who steps into the street and ends the threat.

The reality of NATO air power:

• Germany “reinforces” Poland—by sending two fighter jets
• Why? Because it is not an expeditionary air force
• Operations depend on fixed bases and fixed support systems
• NATO is not an expeditionary air force—only the United States is

And the United States is pulling back. There is nothing NATO possesses that gives Russia a strategic headache.

Those perceived as unpredictable forfeit their status as negotiable adversaries. At that point, deterrence shifts from diplomacy to coercion. For Russia, NATO is not a partner but a risk factor—and risks are not managed; they are neutralized. That is the lethal consequence of sustained escalation rhetoric without operational substance.

The Final Reckoning – Bluffing and Losing

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The most dangerous moment is not escalation itself, but the belief that it carries no consequences.

💬 “The Russians are not bluffing. At some point, a red line will be crossed that forces Russia to act. And the Tomahawk question is designed precisely for that.”

The decisive problem is the widespread belief that Russia is bluffing. Because Russia has not overreacted, many assume it is posturing. In reality, Russia has simply decided to win the war.

It does not play NATO’s game, nor does it take every piece of bait. The Tomahawks are bait—bait designed to provoke a reaction. Vladimir Putin does not take it.

The deadly miscalculation:

• Joe Biden was given the same advice: “The Russians are bluffing”
• They are not
• At some point, a red line will be crossed
• The Tomahawk question could be that line

Until that red line is crossed, why would Russia change course? That is precisely what the West wants—to push Russia off a path that is currently leading to victory.

The Tomahawk is not a decisive turning point. It will not win the war for Ukraine. What it could produce, however, is a chain of miscalculations that ultimately draws the United States and Russia into a nuclear war.

Donald Trump’s Tomahawk promise is the most dangerous decision of his presidency. It is orders of magnitude more dangerous than anything Biden has done. And it rests on the deadliest assumption of the Russophobes: the belief that Putin is bluffing.

The choice now stands:

• Continue taking the bait—and cross the nuclear threshold
• End the war before the red line is crossed
• Understand that Russia is winning—and not bluffing
• Or stumble into World War III because reality is refused

Putin has described Ukraine as the third sister. He invites her back into the fold. NATO, however, is the rabid dog. And Russia is Atticus Finch—loading the rifle.

The Tomahawk trap is set. The only remaining question is whether Trump will be foolish enough to walk into it.

The greatest danger in this conflict is not escalation, but self-deception. Those who believe Russia is bluffing mistake restraint for invitation and patience for weakness. The Tomahawk trap is the pure expression of this error. If it is triggered, it will not be out of strategic necessity, but out of refusal to accept a lost position. And that is how wars begin that no one can control.

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Thank you, Scott Ritter.

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Sources & Geopolitical References

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Substack – US-Edition

This article is also available as a English-language edition on Substack:

    Trump’s Tomahawk Trap - Why World War III Is Closer Than Ever - Scott Ritter

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Original conversation (video)

YouTube-Interview:

    Trump’s Tomahawk Order: WW3 Incoming - Scott Ritter

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